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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Plaintiffs/Appellants Ruf, Inc. and Donald M. Dudley
("Buyers") petition the Court for a rehearing on its affirmation
of the trial court!s grant of Summary Judgment in favor of
Defendant/Appellees Icelandic Investments, Inc. and Robert
Johnson ("Sellers") which the Court based upon the Buyers'
failure to mitigate their damages.

The Buyers also request

rehearing on the Court's affirmation of the trial court's grant
of Summary Judgment to Defendant/Appellee VR Utah, Inc.
("Broker") based upon the Release of Liability in the contract.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
This litigation centers on a transaction wherein the Buyers
purchased a business from Sellers, which purchase was brokered by
the Broker.

In connection with the sale, the Sellers, at the

Broker's behest, made an admittedly material misrepresentation
that there was no pending litigation against the business. As
Buyers later learned, there was pending litigation seeking in
excess of $80,000, more than the purchase price of the business.
Buyers, upon learning of the litigation by being named as a
party, brought suit against Sellers and Broker asserting claims
for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation.

Sellers

counterclaimed for the balance of the purchase price remaining
unpaid.
The trial court granted summary judgment against Buyers and
in favor of Sellers on all claims and counterclaims.

On April 1,

1999, this Court rendered its decision in this case in a

Memorandum Decision, Case No. 971691-CA, Ruf, Inc. et. al. v.
Icelandic Investments, Inc. et. al.. A copy of that Memorandum
Decision is attached as Addendum "A".

In that decision, the

Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Sellers on Buyers' claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.

The Court based its decision on its belief

that the undisputed facts show that Buyers failed to attempt to
obtain financing elsewhere once the initial source fell through.
Because Buyers failed to mitigate his damages, the Court held the
Buyers were not entitled to recover damages "for any harm that
could have been avoided by the use of reasonable effort...."
Memorandum Decision, p. 3.

See

The Court in so stating, however, did

not follow its own precedent, and that of the Utah Supreme Court,
because mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense which
requires the defendant (i.e., Sellers) to put forth specific
evidence that the plaintiff (i.e., Buyers) failed to take
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages.
In addition, the Court affirmed the Summary Judgment granted
to Broker on the basis of the Release of Liability clause in the
contract at issue because that clause "defined the roles" of the
parties and Buyers affirmatively disclaimed any reliance on
broker.

This overlooks the facts in the record, however, that

the Broker affirmatively encouraged Sellers to lie to Buyers and
conceal a material fact.

2

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE ITS DECISION ON SELLERS' SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST BUYERS.
A.

Mitigation is an Affirmative Defense and Sellers Did
not Show a Failure to Take Reasonable Steps To
Mitigate.

This Court should reverse its prior decision upholding the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sellers
because Sellers failed to meet their affirmative burden of
presenting evidence that Buyers failed to take reasonable steps
to mitigate their damages.

The Court upheld the summary

judgment on the following grounds:
Proof of damages is a required element of fraud or negligent
misrepresentation
[Buyers] argue that they lost their
source of financing due to the misrepresentation, and thus
have demonstrated damages. However, this assertion of
damage is legally insufficient to withstand summary
judgment. The undisputed facts show that [Buyers] failed to
attempt to obtain financing elsewhere once his initial
source fell through. Because [Buyer] failed to mitigate his
damages, he is not entitled to recover damages for any harm
that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable
efforts.... To prove damages, [Buyers] must have at least
attempted to get other financing. Only had he been unable
to do so, could he then claim the loss of financing as
legitimate damage. Thus, we affirm the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to seller.
Memorandum Opinion, p. 3 (citations omitted).

Thus, the Court

based its decision solely on its view that Buyers failed to
mitigate their damages and implicitly stated that, absent such a
failure to mitigate, the loss of financing was sufficient damage
to defeat summary judgment.
The flaw in this analysis is that it is the burden of
Sellers, not Buyers, to show by specific evidence that Buyers
failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate his damages.
3

The

Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it is the
defendant' s burden to show a failure to mitigate "by producing
competent evidence proving plaintiff had not taken reasonable
efforts to mitigate his damages...." Pratt v. Board of Education
of Uintah Ctv. Sch. Dist., 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977).
Furthermore, this Court in John Call Eng'g v. Manti City
extensively discussed the issue of mitigation and stated that
"the defendant has the burden of proving that damages shown could
have been minimized."

John Call Eng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d

678, 680 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting D.Dobbs. Remedies, § 12.6, at
830 (1973)) (emphasis added).

[T]he doctrine requires defendant

to show with specificity why the damages sought are not
proper because of successful efforts to mitigate or failure to
reasonably mitigate.

Id. at 681 (emphases added).

Thus, it is

Sellers* burden to come forward with specific evidence that
Buyers failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate their damages.

Sellers have completely failed to produce such evidence.
The facts are somewhat similar to those in Pratt in which the
defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate his
damages after losing his job at the school district.
P.2d at 295.

Pratt, 564

The school district sought to instruct the jury on

the issue of mitigation. However, the trial court denied this
request because the school district had failed to put forth
sufficient evidence.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this

decision and stated that, because mitigation is an affirmative
4

defense, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that
the plaintiff either found, or, by the exercise of proper
industry in the search, could have procured other employment....
Id. at 297 (quoting Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Sec. 1360,
pp. 312-313) (emphasis added).

Thus, the defendant, in this case

Sellers, had the burden of showing that Buyers, through the
exercise of proper industry in the search, could have procured
alternative financing in order for failure to mitigate to be a
proper defense.

However, Sellers have not introduced one shred

of evidence on the record that Buyers could have obtained such
financing under the circumstances.

Sellers would have to show by

affirmative evidence that an individual just out of college, with
no assets, no collateral, no inventory, no borrowing history, no
profit history, with an outstanding debt of $100,000 and with a
lawsuit against him for over $80,000 could have obtained
financing through reasonable efforts.

Not only have Sellers not

done so, they have not even attempted to do so.
This Court has improperly shifted the burden to Buyers to
produce evidence that they mitigated their damages in order to
avoid summary judgment against them.

The burden of showing a

failure to mitigate damages falls, however, solely upon Sellers
and they have failed to meet this burden by producing any
evidence that Buyers could have obtained financing under these
circumstances.

Summary Judgment in Sellers1 favor was therefore

inappropriate and should be reversed.
In addition, even if Buyers were required to produce
5

evidence of mitigation to defeat summary judgment, the Court
failed to take into account that Buyers did in fact produce
evidence that the failure to seek alternative financing was
reasonable.1

Given this evidence, summary judgment on this

basis was error and, at the least, the question should be decided
by a jury. Although the Utah courts have not explicitly stated as
such, the law is clear that the reasonableness of the plaintiff s
actions in mitigating damages is a question of fact for a jury.
See, e.g.. Flint v. Hart, 917 P.2d 590, 596 (Wash. App. Div. 3
1996) (The plaintiff has an obligation to mitigate damages....
The reasonableness of his or her conduct in doing so is a
question for the jury.); Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 946
P.2d 904, 912 (Idaho 1993) (upholding ruling that property
owner's refusal to rent property, and thereby mitigate damages,
would not reduce damage award and stating that, "[w]hether the
action taken by Mrs. Wayne was reasonable was a question of fact
. . . . " ) ; Garrett v. Union Pacific R.R., 828 P.2d 994, 997 (Okl.
App. 1992) ("It is for the jury to decide if Garrett had
exercised reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages by
attempting to return to work or find other employment.).
Thus, the evidence presented in this case, coupled with
Sellers' complete failure to meet its burden of producing
evidence that Buyers failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate
1

Buyer presented evidence that applying for additional
financing would have been futile given his financial condition
and his belief that there was no possible way he would receive
such financing. See Affidavit of Donald M. Dudley, H 10. [R853857] .
6

damages, creates, at a minimum, a question of fact concerning
mitigation for the jury to decide.

All inferences must be taken

in the light most favorable to Buyers and a jury could easily
decide that the failure to seek alternative financing was
reasonable, thus negating any claim of failure to mitigate.
Sellers have completely failed to meet their burden of
submitting specific evidence that, through reasonable efforts,
Buyers could have found alternative financing.

This alone

should result in the denial of Sellers' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

In addition, despite having no burden to do so absent

Sellers' meeting its burden, Buyers have come forward with
sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury
concerning mitigation.

As this was the only basis for upholding

the Summary Judgment, the Court should reverse its prior decision
and reverse the Summary Judgment.
B.

There is No Basis for Awarding Damages to a
Seller Who Intentionally Misrepresents a
Material Fact And The Rescission Issue Was
Overlooked By The Court.

The Court, in its decision, did not address the award of the
remaining contract balance to Sellers or the issue of rescission.
Sellers admit that they made a misrepresentation to Buyers
concerning the outstanding litigation and that such a
misrepresentation was material. The trial court's award to
Sellers of the balance of the contract defies both logic and
justice.

Even if the Court does not allow Buyers to recover

their damages, the Court should, at a minimum, reverse the trial
court's summary judgment against Buyers for the contract price
7

and allow Buyers to seek recision on the basis of fraud.

Summary

Judgment for the contract balance means that Sellers will profit
from an admittedly fraudulent transaction.

The Court should not

allow such an award to stand.
Buyers pleaded rescission as an express defense to Seller's
counterclaim seeking to recover the balance of the purchase price
owed under the contract.

Buyers, in their Answer to the

counterclaim, expressly plead:
The Note which is the subject of the Counterclaim is subject
to rescission given the conduct of the [Sellers] as alleged
in the Complaint which is incorporated by this reference.
Despite the existence of this affirmative defense, neither the
trial court nor this Court addressed that well-plead rescission
defense in granting and affirming judgment in Sellers' favor on
its counterclaim.

The rescission defense precludes recovery on

the Note and judgment in Sellers' favor on the counterclaim was
error.2
II.

BROKER SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNIZED FROM ITS AFFIRMATIVE ATTEMPT
TO INDUCE FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
The Court should also reverse its decision upholding summary

judgment in favor of Broker which was based upon Article XX of
the contract at issue which stated that Buyer acknowledges that
Broker has not verified or will not verify the representations of
the Seller. See Memorandum Decision, p. 2.
2

However, this is not

While the rescission by Buyers in this case is clear,
in the event there is any question regarding rescission it is a
question of fact which would preclude the entry of summary
judgment and requires reversal. E.g., Knudsen Music Co. v.
Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 256, 240 P.2d 973, 975 (1952) (citations
omitted).
8

an instance in which the Buyer seeks to hold the Broker
responsible merely for misrepresentations made by the Seller, in
which case the clause might arguably apply.

Here, it is

undisputed that the Broker affirmatively encouraged the Sellers
to lie to the Buyers concerning a material fact of the
transaction.

This conduct goes well beyond the Broker

fulfilling its "defined role" as a party from whom no
representations could be relied upon.

The Court has essentially

stated that a party can actively take part in fraudulently
concealing a fact that it knows to be true and material to the
transaction and then simply insulate itself from liability with a
clause in the fraudulently obtained contract.

This is clearly

against public policy and directly contrary to the Utah Supreme
Court's discussion in Ong Int'1 (U.S.A.) v. 11th Avenue Corp.,
850 P.2d 447, 453 (Utah 1993) .

The Broker, however, went well

beyond its role and actively encouraged Sellers to commit fraud.
The language of Article XX simply does not support the Court's
interpretation and, if it did, the clause itself would be void
for fraud and against public policy.

The Court should therefore

alter its decision and reverse the trial court* s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Broker.
III. CERTIFICATION.
The undersigned certifies, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
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CONCLUSION.
For the above stated reasons, Buyers respectfully request
that the Court of Appeals revisit its prior ruling and reverse
the trial court's summary judgments in favor of Sellers and
Brokers.

Otherwise, the undisputed, intentional, fraudulent

conduct of both Sellers and Broker will be rewarded and the
victim of such fraud will not receive recompense.

Such a result

would be unjust and contrary to Utah law.
DATED this \<^ day of April, 1999.
ATKIN Sc LILJA, P.C.

£han L. HawKiTrs \
Attorneys 'for Appellafvt^s,
Donald M. Dudley and Ruf, Inc.
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